

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**An Indirect Strategy for Sanctuary Defeat:  
Addressing Pakistan's Regional Security Concerns**

by

Neil E. Anderson, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Edwina S. Campbell, PhD

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>APR 2009</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>An Indirect Strategy for Sanctuary Defeat: Addressing Pakistans Regional Security Concerns</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT <b>The United States and its allies have made great progress in Afghanistan. However, it has not yet achieved its goals regarding defeat of the Taliban and al Qaida. The insurgent sanctuary in western Pakistan is probably the most significant reason this is true. Therefore, the US must pursue an effective way to eliminate that sanctuary. Fundamentally, this should be a counterinsurgency campaign. However, the US could execute that campaign in a number of ways. First, they could pursue a US-led or Pakistani military-led military option. However, both are likely to alienate the local population and actually reduce the legitimacy of the Pakistani government within the tribal areas. The second option is to pursue a whole-of-government approach to address the root causes of discontent the insurgents exploit. However, because of history and the perception of its regional security environment, the Government of Pakistan maintains policies toward the tribal areas that prevent this strategy from being successful. Therefore, the thesis of this paper is that US must pursue a strategy that works with Pakistan to stabilize their regional security concerns in order to allow it confidence to adjust tribal area policies. Once Pakistan is less concerned with its regional security environment than its internal security environment, it will be able to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign to eliminate the sanctuary. This paper frames the basic components of an interagency strategy to accomplish this goal.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>SAR</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>30</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

## Contents

Disclaimer .....	ii
Preface.....	iv
Abstract.....	vi
Introduction.....	1
A Realistic Look at the United States’ Policy Options.....	5
The Strategic Context to the Sanctuary’s Problems – Conflict with India .....	6
Framing a Strategy .....	10
Conclusion .....	18
Appendix A – Cognitive Map of Logical Relationships .....	21
Appendix B – Insurgent Influence Within the Sanctuary .....	22
Bibliography .....	23

## **Preface**

The more I read and learn about Afghanistan, the more complex its challenges appear. Of all the United States' military and foreign policy issues, Afghanistan will continue to be one of the hardest to accomplish. The prospects for a strong economy are limited. The notion of a central government is foreign. There is no unifying ethnicity. Drugs and drug money are prevalent, and the Taliban, Taliban-associated insurgents, and al-Qaida continue to be a threat. Of all of these concerns, I find the insurgent-terrorist threat the most immediate and professionally interesting.

However, when considering the insurgent and terrorist threat associated with Afghanistan, it is impossible to separate the problem from Pakistan. The insurgents and al Qaida exploit the under-governed tribal areas in western Pakistan to the detriment of Afghanistan every day. I am convinced that solving the insurgent threat in Afghanistan means eliminating the sanctuary in Pakistan. Unfortunately, stating that eliminating the sanctuary is not an easy task is a gross understatement.

I approached this research as an opportunity to better understand the problem and what could be done. Yes, this is a very difficult problem. However, using all of the resources of the United States government, surely there is a solution available. The more I understood the problem and the context of the problem, the more I came to believe a regionally-focused, holistic strategy is required. There is no a cheap fix to make the sanctuary disappear, but something must be done. This paper represents an attempt to further the dialogue on potential solutions.

I would like to acknowledge those who provided assistance in my endeavor. First and foremost, I must thank my wife and children. Without their support and understanding, the time I spent in research and at the computer would not have been possible. Furthermore, I should

apologize for the time that I was with them, but continued to mentally mull over this project.

Secondly, I need to thank Dr. Edwina Campbell for her assistance as my research advisor at the Air Command and Staff College. Without her time and thoughts on security issues in foreign policy, this paper would be less effective. Finally, I need to thank Dr. Jonathan Zartman, a regional subject matter expert at the Air Command and Staff College, who provided his judgment on my thesis. The time he spent far exceeded my expectations and lent clarity to the final product.

## **Abstract**

The United States and its allies have made great progress in Afghanistan. However, it has not yet achieved its goals regarding defeat of the Taliban and al Qaida. The insurgent sanctuary in western Pakistan is probably the most significant reason this is true. Therefore, the US must pursue an effective way to eliminate that sanctuary. Fundamentally, this should be a counterinsurgency campaign. However, the US could execute that campaign in a number of ways. First, they could pursue a US-led or Pakistani military-led military option. However, both are likely to alienate the local population and actually reduce the legitimacy of the Pakistani government within the tribal areas. The second option is to pursue a whole-of-government approach to address the root causes of discontent the insurgents exploit. However, because of history and the perception of its regional security environment, the Government of Pakistan maintains policies toward the tribal areas that prevent this strategy from being successful. Therefore, the thesis of this paper is that US must pursue a strategy that works with Pakistan to stabilize their regional security concerns in order to allow it confidence to adjust tribal area policies. Once Pakistan is less concerned with its regional security environment than its internal security environment, it will be able to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign to eliminate the sanctuary. This paper frames the basic components of an interagency strategy to accomplish this goal.



## **Introduction**

The United States, its NATO allies, and the government of Afghanistan have made significant progress in the past eight years in defeating the Taliban, Taliban-associated militants, and al Qaida. However, the campaign is not over, and eliminating the insurgent's sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas ranks highest among the many remaining challenges. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in recent Congressional testimony, "Until the insurgency is deprived of safe havens, insecurity and violence will persist."<sup>1</sup> General David McKiernan, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, recently cited the insurgents' ability to "recruit, stage, train and sustain across the border [in Pakistan]" as a key element in the increasing violence during 2008.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the most recent National Intelligence Estimate covering terrorist threats to the United States regarded al Qaida as the "most serious threat" and specifically identified their sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas as a "key element of its Homeland attack capability."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, long-term stability in Afghanistan and success against al Qaida require elimination of the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Senior defense officials and US policy makers clearly understand that eliminating the sanctuary is in the national interest; however, the United States has not developed a clear strategy to achieve that goal. Highlighting this fact, the US Government Accountability Office recently concluded that, "since 2002 the embassy [in Pakistan] has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)."<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the limited US efforts that are occurring focus on supporting programs and Pakistani military operations directly in the tribal areas.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, the United States cannot achieve its long-term goals through this strategy. First,

policy makers must understand that eliminating the sanctuary requires a counterinsurgency strategy designed to increase Pakistani government legitimacy. Second, they must understand the ongoing strategic competition with India prevents Pakistan from addressing the fundamental issues eroding government legitimacy. Therefore, the United States must employ an indirect strategy, initially focused on facilitating India-Pakistan stability, in order to eliminate the tribal area sanctuary long-term.

### **The Heart of the Sanctuary – Pakistan’s Tribal Areas**

The heart of the sanctuary lies in western Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, the sanctuary extends beyond the FATA. It includes territory as far south as Quetta in Baluchistan and as far north as Chitral in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The complex and unique environment of the tribal areas allows the insurgents to exploit geography, ethnicity, culture, history, political structures and poverty.

The sanctuary’s geography provides the insurgents two distinct advantages. First, the insurgent sanctuary’s location on over 600 miles of border with eastern Afghanistan allows insurgents to conduct operations in Afghanistan and retreat back into Pakistan, where US and NATO troops cannot follow. Second, the wickedly rugged and remote mountainous terrain provides the insurgents places to hide. It also forces the government to use predictable routes, which the insurgents can monitor and ambush.

Ethnically, the tribal areas are primarily Pashtu. Because the Taliban and Taliban-linked insurgents are primarily Pashtu as well, they can easily mix into the local population. More importantly, shared ethnicity creates sympathy within the local population that the insurgents exploit against the primarily non-Pashtu government.<sup>6</sup> The Taliban also facilitates the protection

of al Qaida in the tribal areas and ensures they receive a majority of the same benefits even though most al Qaida members are non-Pashtu.<sup>7</sup>

The most exploited aspect of Pashtu culture is the honor-based, tribal code of *Pashtunwali*. As described by Peter Mayne, an Englishman who spent many years living and working in British India and Pakistan, *Pashtunwali* is a tribal code that grew from the Pashtu's nomadic past to protect travelers from the extreme environment. Within the code, there are several basic tenets; however, three are significant. First, Pashtus must give food and shelter to anyone who asks. Second, Pashtus must grant asylum to anyone who requires it. Third, Pashtus must collectively retaliate against attack.<sup>8</sup> Obviously, this cultural element gives the Pashtun insurgents, and their al Qaida allies, significant leverage to coerce the local Pashtu population's support.

Pashtu tribal area history also supports the insurgents. Throughout history numerous empires swept through Central Asia, and according to the Pashtu, no one ever defeated and subjugated them. Technically this may be true, but it selectively ignores the fact that many would be conquerors saw little value in the barren mountains and simply swept through to richer treasures.<sup>9</sup> Even the British never fully subdued the tribal areas during their colonial rule, and they ultimately allowed a separate political status for the frontier, granting autonomy to the Pashtuns.<sup>10</sup> Regardless of the historical accuracy, insurgents exploit the idea of an unconquered spirit to strengthen anti-government sentiments among rural Pashtuns.

The autonomous political structure, which Pakistan retained after British colonial rule, inhibits central government legitimacy.<sup>11</sup> For example, National Assembly legislation does not apply, and the national and provincial courts do not have jurisdiction within the FATA.<sup>12</sup> Pashtuns perceive the national government as dominated by other ethnicities and unresponsive to

their needs.<sup>13</sup> In today's context of the insurgency, this structure delegitimizes the Pakistani government for many reasons. First, the national political structure does not represent the interests of the local population. Second, the local population views the political agents who are the federal government's representation in the tribal areas as self-serving and corrupt. Third, maintaining a separate structure for the tribal areas, destroys the idea of a central Pakistan. FATA autonomy creates exclusion from the Pakistani political process and disenfranchises the local population. Separating the local population from the government is not conducive to any successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Finally, the tribal areas are economically weak. Because of the historical treatment as a "buffer zone," the British and Pakistanis did not develop the tribal area economy to the same level as the rest of Pakistan.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the tribes' reclusive culture discourages strong economic ties and development with the rest of Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Aside from a distinct lack of infrastructure, the population is largely uneducated, and subsistence agriculture makes up the bulk of the economy.<sup>16</sup> According to Daniel Markey's research for a recent Council on Foreign Relations report, two thirds of households exist below the poverty line and "per capita income is roughly \$250 [per year]—half the national average."<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the State Bank of Pakistan prohibits banks from providing credit to people or potential businesses in the tribal areas.<sup>18</sup> All of these factors combine to create economic disparity between the tribal areas and greater Pakistan, which the insurgents exploit.

In summary, the sanctuary offers many opportunities for insurgents to condemn government legitimacy. The area is remote and the terrain is rugged, which offers superb places to remain out of sight. The Pashtu have a strong independent spirit, which allows the insurgents to ignite anti-central government suspicion. The political structure of Pakistan reinforces the

theme that Pashtuns do not have a full voice in government. Finally, the sanctuary is economically far behind the rest of Pakistan. The Pakistani government faces many threats and lacks popular legitimacy. It requires significant support to overcome these problems.

### **A Realistic Look at the United States' Policy Options**

Beginning with the narrowest perspective, the United States could pursue a military strategy focused directly on the sanctuary in one of two ways. First, if the United States believes Pakistan is unable or unwilling to defeat the insurgents, it could unilaterally attack the insurgency within Pakistan. Second, if the US believes Pakistan is up to the task, it could encourage it to conduct a campaign against the sanctuary. Considering that 96% of the \$10.5 billion in financial aid the US provided Pakistan between fiscal years 2002 and 2007 went to reimburse Pakistani military operations, the second option represents the primary strategy the United States has employed to date.<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, both options undermine Pakistani government legitimacy. The first option implies the Pakistani government is weak and unable to protect its citizens or defend its sovereignty. The second feeds the existing perception that the US is manipulating the Pakistani government.<sup>20</sup> Both options erode government legitimacy. Therefore, they should not be the primary counterinsurgency strategy toward the sanctuary.

The next major strategy the United States could employ is a whole-of-government strategy focused on the tribal areas. Recent US commitments to the FATA Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) are an example of this strategy. The United States pledged \$750 million to support the SDP, which focuses on increasing employment, infrastructure, education, governance and security within the tribal areas.<sup>21</sup> A whole-of-government approach is a step in the right direction, but this effort is unlikely to succeed in the current environment. Because the current Pakistani political structure controls the execution of the SDP, it is highly

subject to corruption and favoritism. As Christine Fair, a US expert on Pakistan, explained in a 2007 interview, “The military and mullahs will stand to benefit the most from this plan.”<sup>22</sup> In addition, the SDP does not acknowledge the fact that Pakistan assesses its security policies through a lens shaped by the perceived threat from India. This affects policies toward the tribal areas in two ways. The Pakistani military maintains the tribal areas as a place to recruit and train insurgents to fight in Kashmir, and as a hedge against a pro-Indian government controlling Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> In short, even though the SDP is a whole-of-government option, it does not resolve Pakistan’s strategic reasons for tolerating illegitimate activities in the tribal areas. Therefore, it will not eliminate the sanctuary.

The US must employ a regionally focused, whole-of-government strategy aimed at stabilizing Pakistan’s regional security concerns, primarily the conflict with India. This strategy will minimize the reasons Pakistan maintains delegitimizing policies toward the tribal areas. As Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid argue in their recent *Foreign Affairs* article, Pakistan cannot be “pressured into acts it considers suicidal.”<sup>24</sup> If the United States is serious about eliminating the sanctuary, it must set the conditions so it will not be “suicidal” for Pakistan to change its policies. Done properly, this strategy will not only reinforce the legitimacy of the Pakistani government, but also help stabilize a nuclear-armed, strategically significant region.

### **The Strategic Context to the Sanctuary’s Problems – Conflict with India**

To understand Pakistan’s policies toward the sanctuary, strategists must understand the history between Pakistan and India. As Sumit Ganguly, a South Asia and Indian Security specialist argues, the competition began prior to independence from Britain, and it is the most important factor shaping how Pakistan assesses its security situation. How each country views its identity fundamentally shapes their relationship. Pakistan sees itself as the Muslim homeland

from the former British colony, and its Muslim identity is a foundation of the state.<sup>25</sup> Pakistan believed in a two-country format, where Muslims could have their own Islamic state, and it was opposed to the idea of secular rule. On the other hand, India formed as a secular government, representative of all identities within South Asia.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, in 1947 India believed it should represent everyone and was opposed to a separate Muslim state.<sup>27</sup> Each country viewed the other's position as a threat to its fundamental identity.

Kashmir became the first battleground for this competition, in which Pakistan and India have fought four wars. The following summary of the explanation provided by T.V. Paul, an International Relations PhD specializing in South Asian security, defines how Pakistan and India view Kashmir. At separation, the British allowed Kashmir, which is primarily Muslim, to retain an ambiguous status, independent from India and Pakistan. However, Britain granted this provision under the premise that Kashmir would hold a referendum to determine which country it would ultimately join. However, before Kashmir held that referendum, its pro-Indian ruler requested Indian military support to defeat an Islamic rebellion fomented by Pashtuns from the tribal areas. Indian military forces intervened, and Kashmir has remained divided. Pakistan feels it should have control of Kashmir because of the Muslim majority, which it believes would have voted to join Pakistan if it had gotten the chance prior to Indian intervention in 1947. India feels that conceding the territory would be an affront to its notion of secular rule and is not about to relinquish control of the portions of Kashmir it controls.<sup>28</sup> Kashmir's status remains at a stalemate; however, the threat of new hostilities drives Pakistani policy.

In addition to Kashmir, a number of other issues remain unresolved. First, terrorist attacks in India continue to threaten the fragile stability of the relationship between Pakistan and India. Second, nuclear weapons add a dangerous dynamic to the relationship. Third, economic

and trade issues create friction in the relationship, and finally, access to energy and natural resources presents another point of contention. The threat of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan is real. Therefore, in the current environment, Pakistan will not commit to policy changes relating to the tribal areas that alter the relative balance of power with India.

The connection between Islamic extremism and Kashmir is one of the strongest links between the conflict with India and the tribal areas. Hassan Abbas articulates the history of this linkage very well in *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*. The Pakistani intelligence organization, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), courted a relationship with Islamic militants during the Soviets' Afghanistan War and during the Afghani civil war that followed.<sup>29</sup> As the Taliban gained control of much of Afghanistan, ISI vectored the militants' activities toward Kashmir because it provided an outlet for the militants' energies in line with Pakistan's regional goals and prevented ISI from having to confront and eliminate its former surrogates.<sup>30</sup> In short, they provided a thinly veiled, but deniable, capability to counter India within Kashmir.<sup>31</sup> The current relationship between the Pakistani government, the ISI and militancy in Kashmir is very ambiguous. However, a comment by former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf indicates that Pakistan has recently tried to continue playing both sides. He characterized the militants into three groups, "al Qaida-Taliban, the Pakistani sectarian groups, and the freedom fighters."<sup>32</sup> In other words, Pakistan may intend to retain some of the militants as freedom fighters. It is unlikely this assessment will change as long as Kashmir remains a strategic consideration for Pakistan.

Pakistan has also tolerated the militants in order to maintain the ability to ensure a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan, because they fear Indian influence on Pakistan's western border. Many Pakistani analysts refer to this notion as "strategic encirclement."<sup>33</sup> Unfortunately, as long as Pakistan fears India at the strategic level, the notion of strategic



encirclement will remain. The desire for a capability to defend against encirclement will remain as well.

Economically, the perceived need to offset Indian conventional military capability creates a large opportunity cost because it prevents Pakistan from investing in programs to improve public support for the government, such as infrastructure and social needs. In terms of sheer size, India's military dwarfs Pakistan's. According to 2006 numbers, India maintained 1.32 million personnel on active duty with another 1.15 million reservists and 1.29 million paramilitary forces. Pakistan on the other hand musters 619,000 active personnel and 302,000 paramilitary.<sup>34</sup> Because its forces are so much smaller, Pakistan must present deterrence through a capable and advanced military. However, according to 2008 estimates, Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only \$454.2 billion, or 14% of India's GDP.<sup>35</sup> Pakistan's smaller military and smaller economy puts it at a numerical disadvantage. It must spend a greater percentage of its GDP to retain a credible deterrence against India. Unfortunately, this prevents Pakistan from spending money on the projects that would increase government legitimacy at home.

These examples demonstrate a direct correlation between the factors delegitimizing the Pakistani government in the sanctuary and its competition with India. Perhaps, if Pakistan did not have to expend as much effort countering India, it could remedy the underlying conditions in the tribal areas. As conditions improved, realistic alternatives to the extremists would emerge, and government legitimacy would increase. At that point, Pakistan could wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign to eliminate the sanctuary, which would not only help the US achieve its goals in the region, but also strengthen the future of Pakistan. But, Pakistan is

unlikely to alter its current policies if the strategic situation with India does not change, and in that case, the situation in the tribal areas will not improve.

### **Framing a Strategy**

Regardless of the fact that this is the appropriate strategy, implementation will be anything but easy or quick. This section provides a broad planning framework to guide the first stages of interagency planning. The purpose is simply to demonstrate a valid starting point for a plan. A fully coordinated and developed plan is not only too complex for the limited scope of this paper, but a large portion of the details and ideas that make plans successful emerge in the dialogue of the planning process. Therefore, this is only a beginning.

Regarding the overall mission, when directed by the President of the United States, an interagency working group subordinate to the National Security Council will plan, synchronize, execute and oversee the international coordination of a whole-of-government strategy. This plan must employ a global strategy focused on Pakistan and its relationship with all regional partners, especially India. By stabilizing the Pakistani relationship with India and increasing Pakistan's economic capacity, it will set conditions for the Pakistani government to pursue meaningful policy changes that increase its legitimacy within the tribal areas in order to eliminate the insurgent sanctuary.

The initial purpose of this effort is to establish an environment of stability between Pakistan and India, to provide Pakistan the confidence to focus on domestic and economic issues. Second, it must assist or encourage others to assist Pakistan in strengthening the same domestic and economic capacity. The final purpose is to eliminate the delegitimizing factors in the tribal areas and enable Pakistan to eliminate the sanctuary.

The following conditions make up the whole-of-government strategy's desired endstate. First, and most important, the sovereign governments of Pakistan and India must remain credible and intact within their current internationally recognized borders. Second, Pakistan and India must agree to resolve disputed territory through a bi-lateral or multi-lateral mechanism without using force. Third, a final state of peace is not required, but Pakistan and India must develop enough trust to facilitate cooperative stability in the region. Fourth, Pakistan's civilian political institutions must be able to maintain rule of law and control over military forces. Fifth, the populations of India and Pakistan must recognize that the economy is replacing the military as the national strategic center of gravity in Pakistan. Finally, sufficient counterinsurgency capacity must exist in Pakistan to allow it to eliminate the sanctuary.

A number of assumptions frame this strategy, and the first is that this must be a true whole-of-government strategy. Not only does the military not have the capacity to execute this level of policy, but any military-driven strategy will severely erode the legitimacy of the US interest and the Pakistani government. Furthermore, this strategy requires significant interagency synchronized mutual support. Similar to maneuver warfare, the plan requires each instrument of power to conduct "shaping operations" to gain a "position of advantage" so the decisive instrument of power for each objective can achieve "decisive points." Because the strategy requires this level of coordination, the National Security Council should establish a working group chaired by a single presidential appointee. The broad nature of the strategy and the strategic implications demand that the NSC retain direct oversight rather than subordinating the strategy to a single government lead agency.

Second, regardless of taking a long-term approach, this is a problem that cannot be completely fixed. Therefore, a strategy must exist to manage it within an acceptable level of

risk. The competition between India and Pakistan runs deep, and this strategy will not resolve their history. The goal is to create a manageable stability that Pakistan and India can agree to, in order to open up space and time for Pakistan to make the necessary changes and increase its legitimacy.

Third, this strategy requires international support and an international face. Unfortunately, the United States does not enjoy significant credibility among Pakistanis.<sup>36</sup> Due to our on-again, off-again relationship with Pakistan, they perceive the US as continually manipulating them to achieve US interests and abandoning Pakistan when the US meets its goals.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, not only does the US need to be extremely transparent in its aims and act in a manner that aids Pakistan, but it will also require a legitimately independent international diplomatic and economic effort to reassure the Pakistani people that this is in their interest.

India and Pakistan are sovereign nations. At the end of the day, Pakistan and India will proceed by themselves, and if they disagree with actions the US forced on them, they can easily undermine them. Therefore, the United States and its international partners must clearly demonstrate to India and Pakistan that these actions are in their own interest. For that same reason, the United States must be willing to accept solutions that meet the intent of the strategy, but may not solve the problem the same way Americans would. The US has goals in this dynamic, but it must not forget that it is helping two sovereign nations. The US must be persuasive, and at times, it will need to be forceful and coercive. However, it must engage Pakistan and India in a manner that does not undermine their legitimacy.

This plan includes three phases and three lines of operations, which the graphic at Appendix A depicts. Phase one is entitled “Stabilizing the Environment.” Phase two is entitled “Increasing Capacity of Legitimacy,” and phase three is “Sanctuary Elimination.” The first line

of operations is “Regional Security.” This line of operations focuses on centers of gravity linked to stabilizing the regional security competition between Pakistan and India. The second line of operations is “Partner Capacity.” This line of operations focuses on exploiting the enhanced regional security in order to strengthen the conditions within Pakistan that contribute to its legitimacy. The final line of operations is “Counterinsurgency.” This line of operations focuses on Pakistani efforts to eliminate the insurgent sanctuary decisively.

Phase I, Stabilizing the Environment, sets the conditions enabling future activities required to eliminate the sanctuary. The purpose of this phase is to stabilize the regional security threats in order to provide Pakistan and India predictability and confidence, which allows political freedom of maneuver in the following phases. Diplomacy is the main effort during this phase, with all other elements of the DIME supporting the diplomatic effort. The center of gravity for this phase is each nation’s fear of the other gaining a competitive advantage that may lead to national loss of territory, wealth, pride or influence.

Within this phase, the *Regional Security* line of operations represents the largest weight of effort. The first decisive point on this line of operation is building an international support base. As previously argued, an international face will maximize transparency and legitimacy among Pakistanis. The second decisive point is earning Pakistani and Indian acceptance of the plan. Without the support of either nation, this plan goes nowhere. However, both sides will benefit from normalization, and if stated properly, both sides will see the endstate’s benefits. The third decisive point is the establishment of a stability forum. An existing forum such as the United Nations or South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation can meet this requirement, or India and Pakistan can create a new forum. Either way, the important factor is that both sides agree to use it. The final decisive point on the *Regional Security* line of operations is an India-

Pakistan stability contract. As mentioned in the assumptions, the intent is not to broker a final peace, but to get both parties to frame their competition in a context within which they can manage the risk.

The *Partner Capacity* line of operations includes two decisive points. The first decisive point is the enhancement and support of Indications and Warning capability. By enhancing Indications and Warning intelligence capability and data-sharing, India and Pakistan can gain confidence in the transparency of the other's actions, which assists risk management. The second, and related decisive point is when a state of deterrence occurs. E. Sridharan, a professor specializing in comparative security at the University of Pennsylvania's Center for the Advanced Study of India, argues that because neither side gained an advantage from skirmishes along the Kashmir line of control following Pakistan and India's nuclear demonstrations of the late 1990s, a state of deterrence exists.<sup>38</sup> He then argues that both countries can exploit this deterrence to expand their economic relationship, most likely in the energy sector.<sup>39</sup> This decisive point should reinforce and legitimize mutual deterrence in order to expand stability and predictability.

Finally, the *Counterinsurgency* line of operations includes two decisive points. The first occurs when India and Pakistan prevent escalatory attacks from Islamic militants. This strategy can withstand setbacks such as the December 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, but if the countries can work together to prevent similar destabilizing attacks, the process will move faster. The second decisive point occurs when Pakistan prevents delegitimizing military actions within the tribal areas. This does not ban all military counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas. To the contrary, the counterinsurgency campaign must continue, but at this point in the process, Pakistan must take great care not to conduct that campaign in a delegitimizing manner.

Phase II, Increasing Capacity of Legitimacy, creates the conditions so the Government of Pakistan can begin a decisive and successful counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas in order to eliminate the sanctuary. The purpose of this phase is to transition Pakistan's strategic center of gravity away from the military and toward the economy in order to expand and reinforce the capacity of legitimacy. The economic instrument is the main instrument of power during this phase, and the *Partner Capacity* line of operations is the primary weight of effort. The center of gravity is Pakistan's belief that its security and future lies with its military.

During this phase, the *Regional Stability* line of operations focuses on preserving the stability gains from Phase I and includes two decisive points. The first decisive point is the joint Pakistani and Indian accomplishment of cooperative projects within the region. Success and dialogue derived from combined projects that are mutually beneficial not only enhance trust between the nations, but the prospect of future benefit assists the preservation of stability.<sup>40</sup> The second decisive point occurs when regional security perseveres throughout the changes occurring in the other lines of operations during this phase. This decisive point is key because Pakistan will be understandably nervous about changing its strategic source of strength from the military to the economy. However, if Pakistan maintains regional stability during the transition, it will greatly reinforce the accomplishment of the Phase II requirements.

*Partner Capacity* represents the primary effort during this phase. This line of operations focuses on the transition of Pakistan's strength away from the military and toward the economy, as well as actions to increase the Government of Pakistan's legitimacy. The first decisive point is the agreement by Pakistan and its international partners on a strategy for economic improvement. The Pakistani economy has challenges, and it will require an international effort to expand the economy into a greater self-sustaining capacity. However, a strong economy is a

necessary component of domestic and regional stability. The second decisive point is the elimination of a separate governing mechanism for the tribal areas. The tribal area population must have an equal stake in the government, including the same constitutional status, rights, and representation. The third decisive point occurs when Pakistan assures civilian control of the military, including the ISI. This is certain to be a sensitive issue. However, legitimacy of the government depends on civilian control of the military. The fourth decisive point will occur when people in the tribal areas recognize that they have gained proportional representation in the economic expansion of Pakistan. Fundamental to increasing legitimacy is being able to demonstrate that all stakeholders are receiving their fair share. The final decisive point, and probably the decisive point for the overall plan, is when the economy replaces the military as the core strength of Pakistan. Once Pakistan can approach problems from an economic perspective, rather than a military perspective, it will become more stable and legitimate.

Finally, the *Counterinsurgency* line prevents further erosion of government legitimacy while preparing counterinsurgency capabilities for future operations. There is only one decisive point along this line of operations for Phase II, and it occurs when the Pakistani military transitions from a conventional force directed against India into a balanced force with counterinsurgency capabilities. Because Pakistan has focused so heavily on military conflict with India, its military is ill-equipped for counterinsurgency operations.<sup>41</sup> Once Pakistan achieves this decisive point, it will be prepared for Phase III.

Phase III, Sanctuary Elimination, completes the plan by using the gains in prior phases to solidify the government's legitimacy. The purpose of this phase is to eliminate the sanctuary decisively, which will lead to the ultimate minimization of the Taliban, Taliban-associated militants and al Qaida to manageable levels. Because of the fundamental requirement to



reinforce legitimacy, the informational instrument of power is the primary mechanism of the DIME for this phase. Similarly, the *Counterinsurgency* line of operation contains the primary weight of effort during this phase. All other actions and instruments of power support enhancing legitimacy. The center of gravity for Phase III is the Pakistani government's legitimacy.

During Phase III, the *Regional Stability* line of operations remains largely unchanged from Phase II. Preserving the stability achieved in prior phases is the purpose during this phase. Therefore, maintenance of the region's stability is the only decisive point. No additional actions are required along this line of operations, but the international community must continue supporting Pakistan and India in their regional stability efforts because a derailment of stability at this point would unhinge the plan at this point.

The *Partner Capacity* line of operations during Phase III includes two decisive points. The first is the sustainment of the Pakistani economy. Pakistan requires a growing economy to continue providing the financing for programs that increase its legitimacy. At the personal level, when individual families believe the economy will provide jobs and money to improve their daily life, extremism becomes a less viable alternative. The second decisive point is the sustainment of the political restructuring from Phase II. Similar to the economy, Phase III relies on prior gains. Therefore, Pakistan must protect its investment.

The *Counterinsurgency* line of operations is the primary weight of effort during Phase III. At this point, Pakistan can leverage the gains from prior phases to increase government legitimacy in the tribal areas. This line of operations includes three decisive points. The first occurs when Pakistan reduces the factors of illegitimacy. It will be difficult to determine objectively when this occurs, but Pakistan must reduce the factors the insurgents are exploiting to a level where they no longer erode government legitimacy. The second decisive point occurs

when the population accepts and believes in those changes. This is the point where Pakistan gains a real advantage over the insurgents. The final decisive point occurs when the counterinsurgency reduces militancy to a level that local security forces can manage. From this point forward, the tribal areas will no longer be an effective sanctuary, and once Pakistan eliminates the sanctuary, the US will be much closer to achieving its own regional goals.

## **Conclusion**

Eliminating the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan directly supports US national objectives of stabilizing Afghanistan and defeating al Qaida. However, unless the United States uses a holistic approach, that also works for the benefit of the Pakistani government, the sanctuary will remain. The Secretary of Defense drives this home in the January 2009 *Joint Force Quarterly* by explaining, “We also understand that over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures that promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit.”<sup>42</sup> Because of the link between Pakistan’s conflict with India and the factors eroding legitimacy in the sanctuary, the US strategy must address regional security. In this case, the United States must employ an indirect strategy initially focused on facilitating India-Pakistan stability, in order to give Pakistan the confidence and political ability to change its policies. Until Pakistan implements a legitimate approach toward the tribal areas, it is impossible for it to eliminate the sanctuary long-term. This is an initial framework demonstrating how the United States could help Pakistan implement such a strategy.

---

<sup>1</sup> House Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Gen David D. McKiernan, “Winning in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” *ISAF Mirror*, Issue 50 (September 2008): 13-14, [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2008/mirror\\_50\\_200809.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2008/mirror_50_200809.pdf).

- 
- <sup>3</sup> National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Washington D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, July 2007), 6, [http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/20070717\\_release.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf).
- <sup>4</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, GAO-08-622 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2008), 4.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid, 11.
- <sup>6</sup> Malou Innocent, "A Model for Modern Insurgency," *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2008, 32.
- <sup>7</sup> *Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the June 2008 Pakistani By-Elections*. Terror Free Tomorrow: New America Foundation, 2008, 3.
- <sup>8</sup> Peter Mayne, *Journey to the Pathans*, (New York, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), 34-35.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, 36-37.
- <sup>10</sup> Government of Pakistan, *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006 – 2015*, (Peshawar, Pakistan: Planning and Development Department, Civil Secretariat (FATA), 2006), 4.
- <sup>11</sup> Malou Innocent, "A Model for Modern Insurgency," *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2008, 40.
- <sup>12</sup> Daniel Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, Council Special Report No. 36 (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, August 2008), 7.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid, 8-9.
- <sup>14</sup> Government of Pakistan, *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006 – 2015*, (Peshawar, Pakistan: Planning and Development Department, Civil Secretariat (FATA), 2006), xii.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, xii.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid, xii.
- <sup>17</sup> Daniel Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, Council Special Report No. 36 (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, August 2008), 5.
- <sup>18</sup> Government of Pakistan, *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006 – 2015*, (Peshawar, Pakistan: Planning and Development Department, Civil Secretariat (FATA), 2006), xiv-xv.
- <sup>19</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, GAO-08-622 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2008), 11.
- <sup>20</sup> Daniel Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, Council Special Report No. 36 (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, August 2008), 4.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid, 20.
- <sup>22</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Decent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, (New York, NY: The Penguin Group, Inc., 2008), 273.
- <sup>23</sup> Daniel Markey, "A False Choice in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 92-93.
- <sup>24</sup> Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 36.
- <sup>25</sup> Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 5.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid, 5.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid, 5.
- <sup>28</sup> T.V. Paul, "Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry," in *The India-Pakistan Conflict*, ed. T.V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8-9.
- <sup>29</sup> Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 11-12.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, 13.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid, 14.
- <sup>32</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Decent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, (New York, NY: The Penguin Group, Inc., 2008), 155.
- <sup>33</sup> Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York, NY: The Penguin Group, Inc., 2004), 553-554.
- <sup>34</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, *The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: The South Asian Military Balance*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 June, 2006): 4, [http://csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060626\\_asia\\_balance\\_south.pdf](http://csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060626_asia_balance_south.pdf).

---

<sup>35</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Rank Order – GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)," *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html> (accessed 6 Feb 09).

<sup>36</sup> Lisa Curtis, *Combatting Terrorism in Pakistan: Going on the Offensive*, Web Memo No. 1991 (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 15 July 2008), 2, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1991.cfm> (accessed 2 Feb 09).

<sup>37</sup> Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), xi.

<sup>38</sup> E. Sridharan, "Improving Indo-Pakistan Relations: International Relations Theory, Nuclear Deterrence and Possibilities for Economic Cooperation," *Contemporary South Asia* 14, no. 3 (September 2005): 322.


<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 334.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 325.

<sup>41</sup> Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 33.


<sup>42</sup> Robert M. Gates, "The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance," *Joint Forces Quarterly* Issue 52 (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter, 2009): 3.

**Appendix A**



**Figure 1.** Cognitive Map of Logical Relationships.

## Appendix B



**Figure 2. Insurgent Influence Within the Sanctuary.** (Reprinted from Bill Raymond, “Taliban Influence NWFP & FATA,” The Long War Journal, [http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/pakistan/NWFP\\_redmap\\_021020081.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/pakistan/NWFP_redmap_021020081.php) (accessed 19 March 2009)).

## Bibliography

- Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Map of Pakistan." Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/maps/802863.jpg> (accessed 11 Mar 09).
- Coll, Steven. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York, N.Y.: The Penguin Group, Inc., 2004.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. and Martin Kleiber. *The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Total and Sub-Regional Balances: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, 26 June 2006, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060626\\_asia\\_balance.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060626_asia_balance.pdf) (accessed 7 February 2009).
- Curtis, Lisa. *Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Going on the Offensive*. Web Memo No. 1991. Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 15 July 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1991.cfm> (accessed 2 Feb 09).
- Ganguly, Sumit. *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.
- Gates, Robert M. "The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance." *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 52 (1st Quarter, 2009): 2-7.
- Government of Pakistan. *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006 – 2015*. Planning and Development Department, Peshawar, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan. 2006.
- Innocent, Malou. "A Model for Modern Insurgency: Anbar, Properly Adapted, Offers Lessons for Quelling Pakistan's Tribal Regions." *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2008, 30-33, 40-41.
- Markey, Daniel. "A False Choice in Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 85-102.
- Markey, Daniel. *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*. Council Special Report No. 36. New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, August 2008.
- Mayne, Peter. *Journey to the Pathans*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1955.

- McKiernan, Gen David D. "Winning in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," *ISAF Mirror*, Issue 50 (September 2008): 12-15,  
[http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2008/mirror\\_50\\_200809.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2008/mirror_50_200809.pdf) (accessed 10 November 2008).
- National Intelligence Council, *National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland*. Washington D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, July 2007,  
[http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/20070717\\_release.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf) (accessed 10 November 2008).
- Paul, T.V., "Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry." In *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, Edited by T.V. Paul, 3-24. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Decent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 2008.
- Raymond, Bill. "Taliban Influence NWFP & FATA," *The Long War Journal*,  
[http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/pakistan/NWFP\\_Redmap\\_021020081.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/pakistan/NWFP_Redmap_021020081.php)  
(accessed 19 March 2009).
- Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the June 2008 Pakistani By-Elections*. Terror Free Tomorrow: New America Foundation, 2008.  
<http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagesstft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf> (accessed 4 November 2008).
- Rubin, Barnett R. and Ahmed Rashid. "From Great Game to Grand Bargain." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2008): 30 – 44.
- Sridharan, E. "Improving Indo-Pakistan Relations: International Relations Theory, Nuclear Deterrence and Possibilities for Economic Cooperation." *Contemporary South Asia* 14, no. 3 (September 2005): 321-339.
- US Government Accountability Office. *Combating Terrorism – The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas*. GAO-08-622. Washington D.C.: US Government Accountability Office, April 2008.
- US House of Representatives. *Hearing on Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq before the House Armed Services Committee*. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008.  
<http://www.understandingwar.org/print/315> (accessed 12 September 2008).